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Bargaining

1
Open Unknowns
0
Cross-Domain Bridges
1
Active Hypotheses

Open Unknowns (1)

Unknown How can bargaining power be empirically measured in real-world negotiations where the disagreement point, the feasible set, and outside options are unobservable, and do observed outcomes match Nash or Rubinstein equilibrium predictions? u-bargaining-power-measurement-real-world-negotiations

Active Hypotheses

Hypothesis The outside option effect in wage bargaining is causal and quantitatively significant: workers who receive competing job offers capture 50-80% of the wage difference as a wage increase at their current employer, consistent with Nash bargaining theory in which the outside option shifts the disagreement point. medium

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